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Abstract. The paper estimates the effects of organized crime 
on FDI inflows in 103 Italian provinces in the period 2004-06. The 
presence of organized crime at a provincial level is quantified through 
several indicators, based on data for different kinds of crimes: 
extortion; association for criminal purposes, including mafia (Art. 416 
and 416 bis of the Italian Penal Code); attacks; arson. Several control 
variables are used, included a proxy for (financial) investment 
incentives provided by public sectors. Estimation suggests that FDI 
inflows are influenced by different variables. Our results show that the 
extent of extortion and the number of persons denounced for 
"criminal association" are significantly and negatively correlated with 
FDI inflows. Finally, our analysis suggests the presence of organized 
crime is a strong disincentive for foreign investors, particularly in the 
less developed Italian provinces.  
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1. Introduction 
The south of Italy, known as the Mezzogiorno, receives a marginal 
share of foreign direct investment (FDI) entering Italy. In the two-year 
period 2005-06 the eight southern Italian regions have attracted less than 
1 % of total FDI flows. In Campania, the southern region with the best 
performance in terms of attracting foreign investment, the flows 
amounted to only 0.2 % of those entering Italy. 
The low degree of the Mezzogiorno’s attractiveness for foreign 
investors is also shown by the “geography” of the multinational firms 
operating in Italy. In 2005, the firms in southern Italian regions with 
foreign participation amounted to only 5 % of all Italian firms with 
foreign participation. For the sake of comparison, suffice it to think that 
in Lombardy alone there were ten times as many firms with foreign 
capital as in the whole Mezzogiorno.  
Despite this performance, in the Mezzogiorno there are several 
factors which, at least potentially, could incentivize the siting of firms 
from outside the area. First of all, the Mezzogiorno represents a major 
share of the domestic market: this area has a population of almost 21 
million, that is, 35 % of the nationwide total. Secondly, there is a 
considerable workforce available (many of whom are skilled), while the 
cost of labour is lower than the Italian average. Further, in many 
southern regions there are extensive non-congested industrial zones 
which are able to offer business location benefits (IPI, 2005). Finally, 
firms that invest in the Mezzogiorno — especially in regions included the 
EU’s “convergence” objective — may benefit from a series of financial 
incentives envisaged by EU programmes and by national laws.  
However, against such potential benefits, in the Mezzogiorno there 
are several business location disbenefits which limit its attractiveness 
(Basile, 2001). One of the factors able to negatively affect the choices of 
potential investors, whether foreign or Italian, is the historically rooted 
presence of several criminal organisations: camorra, mafia, ‘ndrangheta, sacra 
corona unita. The impact of organised crime is particularly high in certain 
regions, notably Calabria, Campania, Sicily and Puglia.  
Crime may be considered an additional risk (or cost) for business 
activity. Especially if of the mafia type, crime may condition business 
operations in various ways: extorting money; retail market limitations; 
being forced to take on suppliers of raw materials or pressurised to 
employ workers; distortions in the functioning of markets and local 
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institutions (Centorrino and Signorino, 1993; Centorrino et al. 1999). In 
general, crime is a signal of a somewhat unfavourable business climate.  
While the links between crime and regional economic 
development have been extensively examined both in theoretical and 
empirical terms, little attention has been paid to estimating the effects on 
foreign investment.  
In this paper we analyse the impact of certain crimes — to be 
assumed as proxies for organised crime — on FDI inflows into the 
Italian provinces. The underlying hypothesis is that, other conditions 
being equal, the presence of crime constitutes a competitive disadvantage 
which limits the degree of an area’s attractiveness for potential foreign 
investors. By extending the results from previous studies (Pazienza et al. 
2005; Daniele, 2007), our analysis shows that the presence of crime 
negatively and significantly affects the FDI inflows, limiting the 
Mezzogiorno’s attractiveness and hence impacting upon the area’s 
economic development. 
2. Foreign direct investment in Italy 
 2.1. The national scenario  
Italy is well below its potential for attracting foreign investment. 
According to UNCTAD, in 2005 Italy was 107th in the world’s 
performance index in attracting FDI, immediately after Sri Lanka1. 
Importantly, Italy’s result is far below its economic size and its weight in 
the international trade system. According to the potential index of 
attractiveness, Italy ranked 29th in the world league table (Tab. 1). 
 
Table 1. Performance and potential indexes for FDI  
 Performance index   Potential index  
Countries 1990 2000 2005 Countries 1990 2000 2004 
Norway 48 60 105 Austria 18 23 26 
Sri Lanka 72 108 106 UAE 26 26 27 
Italy 65 117 107 Italy 17 24 29 
Benin 18 95 108 Slovenia .. 29 29 
Algeria 108 113 109 Bahrain 23 32 30 
The indexes cover 141 countries. The UNCTAD inward FDI performance index is a measure of the extent 
to which a host country receives inward FDI relative to its economic size. It is calculated as the ratio of 
country’s share in global FDI inflows to its share in global GDP. The potential index is based on 12 
economic and politico-economic variables. Countries are ordered according to their 2005 (performance) and 
2004 (potential) index. Source: Our elaboration of UNCTAD data, World Investment Report 2006; 
www.unctad.org/wir. 
 
Comparison with major European countries reveals Italy’s low 
degree of attractiveness. As shown by Tab. 2, in the period 2000-05, Italy 
                                                 
1 Cfr. UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2006; www.unctad.org/wir. 
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received 4.2 % of FDI towards the EU, roughly equivalent to 1.2 % of 
GDP and 6 % of gross fixed investment. These shares are appreciably 
lower than those of its main European competitors and the EU average. 
 
Table 2. Basic data on Italy’s ranking 
Countries Flows in % EU % of GDP % of Gross fixed investments  
United Kingdom 19.0 4.1 21.7 
Germany 14.3 2.9 13.5 
France 12.3 2.9 14.3 
Netherlands 9.1 8 36.8 
Spain 7.9 4.1 18.8 
Italy 4.2 1.2 6.1 
Sweden 3.4 4.1 23.4 
Ireland 3.3 11.8 70.3 
Austria 1.5 2.5 10.8 
Finland 1.4 3.8 21.7 
EU 25 100.0 3.9 22.4 
Source: Our elaborations of UNCTAD data.  
 
There are many reasons for Italy’s poor ability to attract FDI. 
Several studies show that this depends, to a great extent, both on the 
scant efficiency of the bureaucratic and administrative system and on its 
SME-dominated industrial structure, featuring entrepreneurial set-ups 
that are often hostile to mergers and acquisitions on the part of foreign 
firms (Committeri, 2004). Other reasons, some of which are examined 
below, limit Italy’s appeal to potential foreign investors. 
2.2. Regional distribution of FDI  
In all countries FDI tends to be concentrated in certain areas. In 
Spain, for example, Madrid and Cataluña are the main destinations of 
FDI. Also in France, the UK and Greece we encounter clear differences 
between the various regions2. 
In Italy the degree of FDI concentration is fairly high. As shown 
by Table 3, Lombardy has absorbed most (69 %) investment flows 
towards Italy in the two-year period 2005-06. It is followed by Piedmont 
(13 %) and Lazio (7 %). The shares of the other regions are low. Overall, 
the Centre-North has received almost all the FDI in-flow to Italy. The 
share of the Mezzogiorno is residual, amounting to less than 1 % of the 
national total. Equally high regional differences are encountered if we 
                                                 
2 For the French case, cfr. Mayer (2004); for Spain, Hermosilla and Ortega (2001); for 
Britain, Devereux et al. (2006); for Greece, Kokkinou and Psycharis (2004).  
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consider the ratio of FDI to GDP (Fig. 1). In the five-year period 2000-
05, net FDI inflows on average represented 1.6% of GDP in the 
Northwest, 0.6 in the central regions and just 0.1 % in the Mezzogiorno.  
 
Table 3. FDI in Italian regions and as a percentage of Italy 
  FDI 2005 FDI 2006  In % Italy 
Abruzzo  71,284 98,161 0.1 
Basilicata 188,778 246,100 0.2 
Calabria 8,969 29,963 0.0 
Campania 305,358 245,991 0.2 
Emilia Romagna 3,004,748 5,735,505 3.2 
Friuli 119,177 182,567 0.1 
Lazio 7,513,904 12,010,842 7.1 
Liguria 619,756 1,074,358 0.6 
Lombardy 84,986,699 104,464,729 68.9 
Marche 62,310 55,632 0.0 
Molise 180,097 21,313 0.1 
Piedmont 18,856,070 17,392,351 13.2 
Puglia 120,067 247,269 0.1 
Sardinia 29,320 97,674 0.0 
Sicily 54,542 30,135 0.0 
Tuscany 4,370,503 2,916,814 2.6 
Trentino A. A. 200,837 744,712 0.3 
Umbria 1,182,322 1,189,123 0.9 
Valle d’Aosta 3,835 1,292 0.0 
Veneto 5,293,644 6,356,404 4.2 
Italy 121,878,576 153,140,935 100.0 
Centre-North 120,920,161 152,124,329 99.3 
Mezzogiorno 958,415 1,016,606 0.7 
The data refer to FDI gross flows IDE and do not include trade credits and transactions in the 
banking sector. Source: UIC. 
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Figure 1. FDI as a percentage of GDP in Italian macroregions, 2000-05 average 
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Mezzogiorno
Northeast
Centre
Centre-north
 Northwest
Net FDI on GDP (%)
 
Source: Net FDI inflows. Our elaborations of UIC and ISTAT data.  
 
Data by province show an even greater degree of concentration. 
Table 4 reports the first and last ten provinces drawn up on the basis of 
FDI incoming flows in the two-year period 2004-05. Importantly, the 
province of Milan alone absorbs over 66 % of FDI and the top three are 
provinces with large urban areas. Moreover, the data show that nine of 
the last ten places are occupied by provinces in the Mezzogiorno.  
 
Table 4. First and last 10 provinces by FDI in-flow in the years 2004-06 as a % 
nationwide percentage 
Ranking Province FDI  Ranking Province FDI  
1 Milan 66.46 94 Foggia 0.00 
2 Turin 9.25 95 Ragusa 0.00 
3 Rome 6.33 96 Reggio Cal. 0.00 
4 Florence 3.06 97 Gorizia 0.00 
5 Verona 2.86 98 Agrigento 0.00 
6 Bologna 2.63 99 Catanzaro 0.00 
7 Cuneo 2.03 100 Caltanissetta 0.00 
8 Terni 0.99 101 Enna 0.00 
9 Alessandria 0.75 102 Vibo Valentia 0.00 
10 Vicenza 0.56 103 Oristano 0.00 
Source: Elaboration from Italian Exchange Office data  
 
On the provincial level, FDI has a high degree of area 
concentration and spatial autocorrelation, a sign of the importance 
played by agglomeration phenomena: in geographically close provinces 
investments tend to assume very similar patterns, especially in southern 
Italian provinces (Bronzini, 2004). Moreover, the degree of attractiveness 
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of individual provinces tends to remain stable in time: indeed, as shown 
by Fig. 2, the coefficient of autocorrelation in the FDI inflows is very 
high (R2 0.8). 
 
Figure 2. Correlation between FDI inflows into the Italian provinces in the years 
2001-03 and 2004-06 
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Average FDI inflows in natural logarithms. Source: UIC data. 
2.3. Multinationals in the Italian regions  
The presence of foreign firms in the Italian regions may be 
examined in depth by means of data on the number of firms with 
foreign participation headquartered in Italy. Of over 6,800 firms with 
foreign participation operating in Italy in 2005, only 371 (i.e. 5 % of the 
total) were headquartered in southern Italy (Tab. 5). By comparison, in 
Lombardy alone the number of foreign-participated firms was ten times 
higher than in the whole Mezzogiorno. 
 
Table 5. Number, employees and sales of participated Italian firms  
Years  Firms Employees  Sales  
 Centre-North Mezzogiorno Centre-North Mezzogiorno Centre-North Mezzogiorno 
2001 6,359 329 850,698 62,136 315,290 18,611 
2004 6,739 347 867,294 60,071 346,353 18,031 
2005 6,810 371 858,912 61,663 363,297 18,970 
For the region where the firm is headquartered; data refer to January 1st in each of the years considered. 
Source: Elaborations of the REPRINT data base, ICE - Milan Polytechnic. 
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Table 6. Firms with foreign participation by region as a percentage nationwide 
Regions Firms Employees Sales Regions Firms Employees Sales 
Valle d'Aosta 0.2 0.3 0.3 Lazio 7.5 10 16.7 
Piedmont 9.5 15.6 12.5 Abruzzo 0.9 2.2 1.7 
Lombardy 51.8 46.4 46.3 Molise 0.2 0.1 0 
Liguria 2.5 2 2.3 Campania 1.6 1.5 1.1 
Veneto 6 4.7 4.7 Puglia 0.7 0.8 0.6 
Trentino-Alto Adige 1.9 1.5 1.2 Basilicata 0.3 0.7 0.6 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 1.8 2.5 1.8 Calabria 0.2 0.1 0 
Emilia-Romagna 7.9 5.8 5.3 Sicily 0.8 0.6 0.3 
Tuscany 4.3 3.1 2.8 Sardinia 0.5 0.7 0.6 
Umbria 0.7 0.7 0.8 Centre-North 94.8 93.3 95 
Marche 0.7 0.5 0.4 Mezzogiorno 5.2 6.7 5 
 (a) the region in which the firm is headquartered is considered; the data refer to January 1 2005. Source: 
Elaborations of the REPRINT data base, ICE - Milan Polytechnic. 
 
 
Table 6 presents the data on the regional presence of firms with 
foreign capital. The case of Lombardy is striking: the region contains half 
of the all Italian firms that have foreign capital and generates over 45 % 
of employment and sales of such firms. As observed for FDI inflows, 
Lombardy is followed by Piedmont, Lazio and Emilia. Overall, foreign 
participated firms in the Centre-North in 2005 generated 95 of sales and 
employment of all firms with foreign capital in Italy. 
This confirms that the geography of foreign investments in Italy 
has clear regional differences and that the Mezzogiorno is, overall, 
completely marginal to the dynamics of passive internationalisation in 
the country. 
2. 4.  Determinants of foreign direct investments 
In this section we will briefly examine some of the main 
determinants of FDI3. To offer a taxonomy of these determinants it is 
worth distinguishing between horizontal (market seeking) and vertical FDI. 
In the case of horizontal FDI (which are prevalent in advanced 
economies), the fundamental determinant is market size. This type of 
FDI tends to flow to high-income countries with a large population, i.e. 
to places that have relatively low transport costs and allow access to large 
markets. By contrast, vertical FDI is greatly influenced by international 
                                                 
3 The empirical literature on the topic is very extensive. For a review of models and 
studies on the determinants and effects of FDI, see, for example, the work of Barba 
Navaretti and Venables (2006).  
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trade costs (insofar as products have to cross several borders in the 
various phases pf the production process) and by the costs of production 
factors. The degree of a country’s attractiveness depends on other 
variables. Of particular importance are those related to the quality of 
institutional systems (political stability, degree of corruption, absence of 
conflict) and the so-called business climate (Busse and Hefeker, 2007).  
FDI may be an important factor for development: they 
contribute to capital accumulation, employment creation and technology 
transfer (Uppenberg and Riess, 2004; Konings, 2004). This is why many 
countries implement active policies to attract FDI. Such policies may 
include incentives for investments, subsidies, tax relief, real services and 
technical assistance to investors. However, the effect of such incentives 
on FDI is controversial.   
Studies show that incentives may affect the business location of 
multinationals provided, however, that the latter have already taken the 
decision to make the investment in a given regional context. With 
reference to the European Union, Devereux and Griffith (2002) find that 
the national differentials in tax rates affect business location of American 
multinationals, but only after they have made the choice to invest in 
Europe.  
In general, from empirical studies it emerges that subsidies (in 
their various forms) are not a decisive determinant for the degree of 
attractiveness of a country or region. A study on the Irish case shows 
that regional policies, despite promoting foreign business location in 
disadvantaged areas of the country, have acted almost “selectively” on 
firms with a low technological content (Barrios et al. 2003). However, in 
Italy, as in France, Spain or the UK, research shows that financial 
incentives for investments (e.g. grants or easy-term loans), tax relief or 
EU structural policies do not have a significant effect in attracting 
foreign investment in underdeveloped regions (Mayer, 2004; Pelegrìn 
Solè, 2002; Devereux et al. 2006; Daniele, 2007). In reality, the decision 
to invest in a country or in a region is affected by a set of variables — 
potential market size, availability and quality of human capital, 
infrastructures. Hence, in the presence of structural constraints, subsidies 
are rarely sufficient to attract investment. 
Distribution of FDI within a country may be incentivised (or 
disincentivised) by several factors specific to the regional or local context 
(Basile, 2002; Basile et al. 2004; Artige and Nicolini, 2005). Although the 
attraction factors may differ according to the regions considered, the 
chief determinants include: 
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 the size of local markets, which may be approximated by 
aggregate per capita GDP, which significantly affects horizontal 
FDI;  
 the presence of agglomeration economies, especially those 
deriving from previous business location of foreign firms, which 
signal the availability of infrastructures, high-quality human 
capital, high productivity and a high degree of sector 
specialisation; 
 the presence of a favourable socio-institutional environment for 
business location, such as an efficient institutional and 
bureaucratic system.  
Unlike what happens in other EU countries, in Italy the capacity 
of individual regions to attract FDI is significantly limited by several 
characteristics of the “country-system”. The attraction potential of the 
Italian regions is negatively affected by some inefficiencies of Italy’s 
institutional system, such as those of bureaucracy and the legal system, 
and the relatively high levels of taxation on labour and companies. These 
national traits, rather than those specific to individual local conditions, 
limit the degree of attractiveness of the Italian regions. According to a 
survey by Basile et al. (2005), performed on a broad sample of firms from 
five European countries (Italy, Spain, France, Germany and Britain), 
with the exception of Lombardy, the Italian regions attract on average 
about 40 % less FDI than other European regions with similar 
characteristics.  
Of course, this does not rule out the fact that there may be 
significant differences also at a local level in the presence of business 
location factors. Especially in the Mezzogiorno specific disincentives may 
be encountered that can significantly reduce the degree of attractiveness 
for potential investors. One such factor is the presence of organised 
crime, whose impact is greater than in the rest of the country and on 
which we focus our attention below. 
3. Crime as an economic disincentive  
3.1 Effects on the economy 
The fact that organised crime constitutes a constraint to local 
economic development is clear from many studies that economists, 
sociologists and historians have devoted to examining crime (Catanzaro 
1991; Centorrino et al. 1999; Peri, 2004). There are many ways by which 
crime conditions the legal economy; one of the most evident is the 
extortion of money from firms and retailers. Besides guaranteeing a fixed 
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income, generally used to finance other illegal activities, extortion allows 
a criminal organisation to control their territory and the local economy. 
Moreover, legal firms are very often forced to purchase goods or raw 
materials from certain suppliers, to employ staff with links to the same 
organisations. Constraints or limits may also be imposed on market 
outlets.  
Extortion and control of part of the legal economy are well 
documented by judicial inquiries and extensive research (Catanzaro, 
1991). It is also widely attested that organised crime manages to 
condition the activity of large firms engaged in public works programmes 
for regions in southern Italy (Confesercenti, 2007).  
In general, organised crime increases the risk and costs of 
investment and thus has a depressive effect on the economy. A further 
depressive effect arises from the operations of the same «entrepreneurs 
of crime ». By using violence or corruption to impose monopolies, the 
criminal undertaking conditions the functioning of markets and 
institutions, distorting resource allocation and capturing part of public 
spending. The result is that the market and institutions’ ability to 
function is compromised, and development of the local economy is 
jeopardised (Centorrino and Signorino, 1993).  
According to Becchi and Rey (1994), a system which is imposed 
on the market has several inefficiencies: besides burdening legally 
operating firms with costs through extortion and other obligations 
imposed by firms with ties to criminal associations, criminal protection 
guarantees the activity of inefficient firms, often used as a cover for illicit 
activity.  
Although the effects of organised crime on development have 
been extensively examined, also in theoretical terms (Fiorentini and 
Peltzman, 1995), those on outside investments have received less 
attention. Such effects are, however, intuitive4. 
As regards the Mezzogiorno, the idea that organised crime works as 
a deterrent to foreign investment has been postulated by Sylos Labini 
                                                 
4 That such effects are negative is evident. The issue of security and its importance for 
internal and external investments in the Mezzogiorno has long been part of the political 
and economic debate in Italy. Recently, a series of events has made this issue one of the 
most urgent for development in southern Italy. The Federation of Anti-racket and 
Anti-usury Associations (FAI) has proposed the establishment of a “security tutor” for 
foreign firms interested in investing in the Mezzogiorno (FAI, Antiracket tutoring, 
Experimental three-year project, Naples, 12 December 2007). One of the reasons behind the 
above project was the declaration made by the President of the Council of Ministers at 
the Antimafia summit, according to which organised crime represents a significant 
deterrent for foreign firms interested in investing in southern Italian regions.  
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(1985), who points out that criminal organisations that impose “levies” 
drive production elsewhere while discouraging entrepreneurs from 
investing in the south. This problem was also underlined very clearly by 
the American economist Mancur Olson (1984) who noted that the 
southern Italian regions, due to organised crime, had accrued a huge 
range of extra-governmental institutions. According to Olson, anyone 
wanting to start up a new firm in that environment knew they would 
have to run risks - which could be avoided in a more stable environment. 
The “crime risk” appears to seriously compromise the “image” 
of the Mezzogiorno and hence the overall perception on the part of 
potential foreign investors. The negative impact of crime on investment 
decisions in the south emerges both from surveys and from empirical 
studies. A survey carried out by Marini and Turato (2002) on a panel of 
entrepreneurs in the north-east of Italy interested in internationalisation 
processes shows that almost all the interviewees (92.6 %) think that 
criminal presence is the main constraint to investment in the Mezzogiorno. 
A survey carried out for the Ministry of Economics in 11 countries 
confirms that in the perception of entrepreneurs the Mezzogiorno appears 
like an area with shortcomings in security (Gpf-Ispo, 2005). In addition, 
organised crime is only one aspect — certainly the most evident — of a 
social and institutional context with other forms of illegality. Such forms 
of illegality include corruption and, more commonly, violation of non-
penal but important laws for the good functioning of the economy. A 
major result is that what emerges is a socio-institutional environment and 
business climate which are somewhat unfavourable for business activity. 
Recently, it has been shown (Basile 2001, Pazienza et al. 2005 and 
Daniele 2005; 2007) that organised crime negatively affect FDI inflows 
into Italian regions. Pursuing this strand of research, in the section below 
we offer an estimate of the effect of crime on FDI inflows into Italian 
provinces. Our analysis differs from the above studies both because it 
concentrates expressly on the impact of organised crime, and because it 
uses different variables and estimation procedures.  
3.2. Geography of organised crime  
In this paper we will measure the occurrence of organised crime  
in Italian provinces by using data for some types of crime: extortion; 
mafia association, including attacks; arson5. The first two types of crime 
are typical, albeit not exclusive, of mafia organisations. As stated above, 
extortion is one of the ways in which mafia organisations are financed 
                                                 
5 These are crimes reported to the judicial authorities. As emerged from judicial 
inquiries, for some types of crimes such as extortion, the victims often fail to report the 
crime immediately.   
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and control their territory. As regards mafia association crimes (Penal 
Code Art. 416 and 416b), the link between the number of crimes and the 
presence of mafia clan members is evident. Such crimes may therefore 
be assumed as proxies for the presence of organised crime. Arson and 
attacks may be considered as modus operandi which criminal organisations 
use to intimidate other operators (economic or political) or to establish 
control over their territory. Such methods are often adopted by mafia 
organisations. 
In Tab. 7 we report the incidence of the above crimes committed 
in the Italian regions. It may be noted that in the regions of southern 
Italy, the average number of crimes per 10,000 inhabitants is much 
higher than in the rest of the country. Of course, there are significant 
differences in the incidence of organised crime even within the 
Mezzogiorno. With regard to the crimes which we considered, the index of 
organised crime is rather high in Calabria, Campania, Sicily and Puglia. 
What is particularly striking is the case of Calabria where the incidence of 
the crimes in question is far higher than the national average. In this 
region, mafia crimes had an incidence of 196 % compared to the 
national average, extortion 185 % and attacks as high as 717 %.  
As regards extortion, in Italy there are estimated to be at least 
160,000 shop owners involved in this phenomenon. Many of the firms 
affected are located in the southern regions. Payment of protection 
money is believed to affect 70 % of Sicilian shop owners, 50 % of 
Calabrian shop owners, 40 % of those from Campania and 30 % from 
Puglia, amounting to a total of 120,000 shop owners involved in these 
four regions (Confersecenti, 2007). According to a recent study, the 
magnitude of protection money paid by firms is quite variable. In Sicily, 
amounts range from a minimum of 32 euros monthly to a maximum of 
about 27,000 euros, depending on firm size. On average, the amount 
paid is 881 euros (Asmundo and Lisciandra, 2008). Failure to pay 
protection money is accompanied by intimidation, damage and attacks.  
 
Table 7. Extortion, criminal association, attacks and fires for every 10,000 
inhabitants, 2002-05 (Italy=100)   
 Regioni Extortion Criminal association Attacks Arson 
Abruzzo 108 119 47 67 
Basilicata 87 222 29 94 
Calabria 185 196 717 346 
Campania 162 155 99 107 
Emilia-Romagna 77 56 24 66 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 64 96 29 52 
Lazio 86 109 35 78 
Liguria 70 83 39 121 
Lombardy 70 71 35 65 
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Marche 77 68 26 53 
Molise 124 104 34 110 
Piedmont 102 51 58 83 
Puglia 150 119 200 146 
Sardinia 74 36 429 149 
Sicily 143 177 186 166 
Tuscany 88 81 41 92 
Trentino-Alto Adige 49 90 28 59 
Umbria 75 89 35 66 
Valle d'Aosta 44 86 26 38 
Veneto 52 62 18 50 
Centre-North 76 74 34 71 
Mezzogiorno 144 147 220 153 
*Calculated as the sum of crimes for the period 2002-2005 per 10,000 inhabitants. Index Italy = 
100. Source: ISTAT data “Area information system on justice”.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Extortion and criminal association in Italian regions, 2002-05 
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Index calculated as the sum of crimes for the period 2002-2005 per 10,000 inhabitants. Index 
Italy = 100. Source: ISTAT data, “Area information system on justice”. 
  
Fig. 3 illustrates the “geography of organised crime” by means of 
an index produced by the sum of extortions and mafia crimes per 10,000 
inhabitants. Clear regional differences may be observed, with a high 
concentration in the regions of the south, except for Sardinia in which 
the incidence of the two crimes is below the national average. Data by 
province also show that the area distribution of the crimes in question is 
not equal and clearly has north-south differences. If we measure the 
degree of provincial concentration with the Gini index, clear differences 
are observed between crimes (Tab. 8). The level of provincial 
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concentration of extortion and mafia association is appreciably lower 
than that of attacks, in which the data from the Calabrian provinces 
(28% of all attacks recorded in Italy) have a considerable weight. (See 
also Fig .1 in the appendix, which reports the Lorenz curves for each 
crime).  
 
Table 8. Provincial concentration of crimes. Gini indexes  
Gini index  Extortion Mafia association Attacks Arson 
Sample 0.25 0.35 0.77 0.35 
0.35 Estimate of population value  0.26 0.35 0.78 
 
Source: ISTAT data, “Area information system on justice” 
 
Although the “geography” of organised crime has changed over 
time, with progressive expansion from their areas of origin to the regions 
of central and northern Italy, appreciable regional (and provincial) 
differences may still be found. Many areas of the Mezzogiorno are more 
burdened than the rest of Italy by a criminal presence which, as we stated 
above, represents a “competitive disadvantage” which can strongly affect 
development. 
 
4. Empirical analysis  
4.1. Data and methodology 
To estimate the impact of organised crime on FDI we used a 
dataset of observations for 103 provinces. Empirical analysis is based on 
the following specification: 
 
ii2i1i εCrimeβΧβαDIF +++=  [1]. 
In all the regressions, the dependent variable (FDI) is made up by 
the natural logarithm of average gross FDI inflows in each province in 
the years 2004-06. Flow data are gathered by the Italian Exchange Office 
(UIC) with a view to compiling the balance of payments6. By the 
standard definitions, FDI establishes a long-term interest between a 
foreign-based firm and one resident in Italy. They therefore include 
                                                 
6 Use of the three-year mean allows a reduction in volatility which occurs in FDI flows 
to several provinces. Data on flows do not include banking sector transactions and 
trade credits. 
 16 
mergers and partial acquisitions (above a certain threshold) of Italian 
firms on the part of foreign firms and greenfield investments. The UIC 
data do not allow us to distinguish between the two types of direct 
investment. In [1], the vector X represents a set of control variables, 
proxies for the economic provincial structure and size. Control variables 
used are: the resident population (POP); per capita GDP (GDPpc); the 
ratio of provincial GDP to that of Italy (SIZE1); the ratio of provincial 
GDP to that of the region in question (SIZE2); the rate of 
industrialisation (INDUSTR); the index of infrastructure endowment 
(INFR). Also consider a proxy of financial incentives granted to 
investments through Law 488/92 (GRANTS). The incidence of 
organised crime is measured by different variables. We consider data 
regarding crimes of extortion, mafia association, arson and attacks. For 
each crime cumulative data for the years 2002-04 are measured against 
the population (per 10,000 inhabitants). We also use an organised crime 
index (CRIME) given by the sum of extortion and mafia association 
crimes per 10,000 inhabitants. Table 9 contains a description of variables 
and sources. 
 
Table 9. Description of variables and sources 
Variables Description Sources 
FDI  Logarithm of average FDI inflow into provinces in the 
years 2004-2006. Data refer investment flows and do not 
include trade credits and transactions in the banking sector.  
Italian Exchange Office 
(UIC) 
POP Natural logarithm of the resident population in Italian 
provinces in 2004. Proxy of local market size. 
Elaborated from ISTAT 
data Census data. 
GDPpc Natural logarithm of value added per capita in 2004. Proxy 
of the development level  
Elaborated from ISTAT 
data 
SIZE1 Provincial value added in 2004 as a percentage of value 
added  in Italy. Proxy of local market size. 
Elaborated from ISTAT 
data 
SIZE2 Provincial value added in 2004 as a percentage of value 
added region-wide. Proxy of local market size. 
Elaborated from ISTAT 
data 
INDUSTR Industry employees sensu stricto every 1000 inhabitants for 
2003. Proxy of provincial production structure. 
Elaborated from ISTAT 
data. 
INFR Synthetic index of infrastructure endowment (excluding 
ports) in percentage terms compared nationwide. 2004.  
Tagliacarne Institute.  
GRANTS Proxy variable of financial loans granted to firms, given by 
the logarithm of the number of the investment applications 
for incentives under Law 488/92. The data refer to 
applications for incentives to build new production plants 
within industrial sector announcements (excluding “special 
industry” announcements) 
Ministry of Economic 
Development –Ipi-Print 
data base 
EXTORTION Number of reported crimes of extortion. Period 2002-2004, 
cumulative values per 10,000 inhabitants. 
Elaborated from ISTAT 
data, “Area information 
system on justice” (online 
data base). 
MAFIA 
ASSOCIATION 
Number of mafia association crimes reported. Period 2002-
2004, cumulative values per 10,000 inhabitants. 
Elaborated from ISTAT 
data, “Area information 
system on justice” (online 
data base). 
ATTACKS Number of attacks. Period 2002-2004, cumulative values 
per 10,000 inhabitants. 
Elaborated from ISTAT 
data, “Area information 
system on justice” (online 
data base). 
ARSON Number of arson offences. Period 2002-2004, cumulative Elaborated from ISTAT 
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values per 10,000 inhabitants. data, “Area information 
system on justice” (online 
data base). 
CRIME Sum of extortion and mafia association crimes. Period 
2002-2004, cumulative values per 10,000 inhabitants. 
Elaborated from ISTAT 
data, “Area information 
system on justice” (online 
data base). 
 
Table 10 reports the values of correlation coefficients among the 
variables. Note that the indicators of organised crime are negatively and 
significantly correlated with FDI inflows in Italian provinces. Also, the 
same indicators of organised crime are negatively correlated with GDP 
per capita, i.e. with the level of relative development, and with other 
variables representative of the local economic context.  
 
Table 10. Correlation matrix 
FDI POP GDPpc SIZE1 SIZE2   
1.00 0.60 0.60 0.65 0.30 FDI 
 1.00 0.09 0.77 0.37 POP 
  1.00 0.31 0.09 GDPpc 
   1.00 0.42 SIZE1 
    1.00 SIZE2 
INDUS INFR GRANTS EXTORTION ASSOCIAT  
0.49 0.46 -0.14 -0.33 -0.34 FDI 
0.08 0.25 0.33 0.06 0.02 POP 
0.70 0.51 -0.68 -0.52 -0.50 GDPpc 
0.13 0.39 0.11 -0.08 -0.03 SIZE1 
-0.16 -0.04 0.18 -0.05 0.08 SIZE2 
1.00 0.31 -0.45 -0.41 -0.49 INDUSTR 
 1.00 -0.26 -0.15 -0.09 INFR 
  1.00 0.46 0.39 GRANTS 
   1.00 0.39 EXTORTION 
    1.00 ASSOCIATION 
  ARSON ATTACKS CRIME  
  -0.49 -0.38 -0.39 FDI 
  -0.11 -0.12 0.06 POP 
  -0.65 -0.44 -0.60 GDPpc 
  -0.18 -0.13 -0.07 SIZE1 
  -0.13 -0.09 -0.02 SIZE2 
  -0.58 -0.36 -0.51 INDUSTR 
  -0.32 -0.20 -0.15 INFR 
  0.45 0.30 0.51 INCENTIVES 
  0.47 0.30 0.94 EXTORTION 
  0.58 0.44 0.67 ASSOCIATION 
  1.00 0.74 0.59 ARSON 
   1.00 0.40 ATTACKS 
        1.00 CRIME 
Critical value at 5% (for two tails) = 0.1937 for n = 103 
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Fig. 4 illustrates the correlation between the variable Crime and 
FDI inflows into the 103 provinces. The graph shows that many 
southern Italian provinces are clustered in the bottom right-hand sector. 
This corresponds to high Crime index values and low FDI. Of course, 
the partial correlation between the two variables is negative.  
 
Figure 4. Correlation between foreign  investment and organised crime  index 
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Source: Elaborated from UIC and ISTAT data. 
 
The normality tests performed on the dependent variable were 
those of Shapiro-Wilk and Anderson-Darling, both at a significance level 
of 0.05. The results do not allow us to refute the null hypothesis 
according to which the sample follows a normal distribution (Tab. 11). 
 
Table 11. Normality tests on the dependent variable  
Shapiro-Wilk Results Anderson-Darling Results 
W (observed value) 0.978 And.-Darling’s A² 0.566 
unilateral p-value  0.080 unilateral p-value  0.139 
Alpha 0.05 Alpha 0.05 
Alpha significance level of 0.05.  
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Finally, we verified collinearity among the variables by calculating 
the variance inflation factors (VIF). In the absence of collinearity, the 
VIF is known to assume values between 1 and 10. As the results 
obtained (Tab. 12) are clearly below the critical value, it is possible to 
rule out problems of multicollinearity being able to distort estimates. 
 
Table 12. Variance inflation factors 
Variables VIF 
Pop  3.082 
GDPpc     5.335 
SIZE1     3.332 
SIZE2     1.535 
INDUSTR  2.468 
INFR     1.651 
GRANTS 2.784 
CRIME 1.719 
 
4.2. Estimation results 
Equation [1] was initially estimated with an OLS estimator, with 
standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. As reported in Table 13, the 
results show that, overall, the model is sufficiently robust and has good 
explanatory power (adjusted R2 0.70).  
As was expected, the population, economic weight of the 
province in terms of GDP, the rate of industrialisation and the per capita 
GDP are positively and significantly correlated with foreign investment. 
This agrees with the findings on the subject in the literature. By contrast, 
the infrastructure endowment and incentives to firms (measured by 
financial incentives granted under Law 488/92) do not seem to affect 
FDI inflows. The fact that incentives and grants for investment have no 
significant impact on FDI is worth noting. As observed in the previous 
section, there are many empirical studies showing that financial 
incentives (especially if not expressly aimed at foreign firms) seem fairly 
ineffective in attracting FDI. This seems to hold also for Italy in which, 
unlike other countries, there is no policy as yet specifically to attract 
foreign investment.  
The OLS estimates show that the incidence of organised crime is 
negatively correlated with IDE. In particular, the quantity of extortion 
and association for criminal purposes is highly significant. Hence the 
variable Crime (stat t 2.5) is also significant. However, the number of 
arson attacks does not appear to significantly affect investment flows, 
although the coefficient of this variable is negative.  
As we noted above, variability in provincial (and regional) 
distribution of FDI is very high: some provinces (especially that of 
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Milan) receive a very high proportion of total flows. In the distribution 
of  the variable there are therefore some outliers which could distort the 
estimates. The presence of outliers in the dependent variable suggests the 
use of a robust estimator like the LAD (least absolute deviation) which is 
more efficient than the classic OLS when the error term does not have a 
normal distribution (Koenker and Bassett, 1978).  
LAD estimation results are shown in Tab. 14. They are similar to 
those obtained using the OLS estimator, except that, in this procedure, 
crimes of arson and attacks are not significantly correlated with FDI. 
This may be explained by the fact that, if we exclude Calabria which 
represents an outlier with very high values, the differences in the 
incidence of arson among the Italian provinces are not so high. Attacks 
also show a high concentration in some provinces, as shown by the value 
of the Gini index (0.78), and this may justify the results obtained. 
Further, as noted above, correlations between the incidence of attacks, 
extortion and mafia association, albeit significant, are not particularly 
high.  
However, in all the specifications that we used, organised crime, 
as measured by extortion, mafia association and with an index consisting 
of the two crimes, appears to maintain its explanatory power for the 
dependent variable: ceteris paribus, a greater incidence of such crimes 
reduces FDI inflows.  
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Table 13. OLS estimates: Dependent variable:  ln FDI  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
const -46.26** -43.46** -44.74** -45.77** -42.78** 
 (-3.423) (-3.086) (-3.211) (-3.306) (-3.129) 
Pop 1.245** 1.180** 1.167** 1.143** 1.231** 
 (3.134) (3.116) (2.991) (2.944) (3.140) 
GDPpc 3.955** 3.744** 3.909** 3.999** 3.641** 
 (3.313) (3.038) (3.217) (3.274) (3.045) 
Size1 0.2446*  0.2748** 0.2864** 0.2866** 0.2531*  
 (1.781) (1.997) (2.094) (2.135) (1.823) 
Size2 0.009073   0.01159   0.007618   0.009394   0.009479   
 (0.8125) (1.050) (0.7117) (0.8615) (0.8626) 
Industr 0.007666** 0.007117** 0.006756*  0.008005** 0.006987** 
 (2.199) (2.057) (1.862) (2.297) (2.009) 
Infr 0.004531   0.005400   0.003522   0.003929   0.005322   
 (1.134) (1.332) (0.8900) (0.9510) (1.385) 
Incentives 0.1492   0.1268   0.1377   0.1316   0.1564   
 (1.460) (1.263) (1.319) (1.241) (1.554) 
Extortion -0.2535*      
 (-1.821)     
Association  -0.6254**    
  (-2.007)    
Arson   -0.05883     
   (-1.324)   
Attacks    -0.1163**  
    (-2.591)  
Crime     -0.2858** 
     (-2.495) 
n 103 103 103 103 103 
R2 0.6981 0.6998 0.6962 0.6960 0.7040 
lnL -173.634 -173.349 -173.952 -173.997 -172.621 
Standard errors are robust with respect to heteroskedasticity. t statistic in brackets - * denotes significance at 
the 10 % level - ** denotes significance at the 5 % level 
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Table 14. LAD estimates. Dependent variable: ln FDI 
 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
const -44.53** -55.06** -53.12** -59.14** -55.40** 
 (-3.585) (-4.231) (-4.234) (-4.848) (-4.325) 
Pop 1.295** 1.415** 1.303** 1.359** 1.533** 
 (4.339) (4.601) (4.223) (4.308) (5.374) 
GDPpc 3.747** 4.689** 4.624** 5.155** 4.600** 
 (3.187) (3.837) (4.003) (4.593) (3.855) 
Size1 0.2755   0.2644  0.2949  0.2999  0.2327   
 (1.356) (1.408) (1.442) (1.456) (1.258) 
Size2 0.008221   0.004152  0.003201  0.0003850  -0.0005929   
 (0.9718) (0.5098) (0.3920) (0.04797) (-0.07479) 
Industr 0.009889** 0.005505  0.007372* 0.006802* 0.005327   
 (2.624) (1.469) (1.956) (1.833) (1.412) 
Infr 0.002529   0.001743  -4.862e-05  -0.002010  0.002889   
 (0.6918) (0.4613) (-0.01250) (-0.5289) (0.8132) 
Incentives 0.02767   0.06178  0.05319  0.08380  0.04378   
 (0.2451) (0.5846) (0.5084) (0.7835) (0.4178) 
Extortion -0.2945**     
 (-2.194)     
Association  -0.6712**    
  (-2.121)    
Arson   -0.04940    
   (-1.339)   
Attacks    -0.06590   
    (-0.7818)  
Crime     -0.2873** 
     (-2.515) 
n 103 103 103 103 103 
lnL -173.634 -173.349 -173.952 -173.997 -172.621 
t statistic in brackets - * denotes significance at the 10 % level ** denotes significance at the 5 % level.  
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5. Concluding remarks 
The regions in southern Italy attract a wholly marginal share of 
FDI flows to Italy. Empirical studies show that, at a regional level, 
investment flows are affected by many determinants, the main ones 
being the size of the potential market, agglomeration economies, the 
presence of other foreign firms and productive specialisation. The low 
attractive capacity of the Mezzogiorno is affected by these factors. 
In this paper we focused on a disincentive often overlooked by 
the literature on the subject: impact of organised crime on FDI. 
Empirical analysis shows that (other conditions being equal) the impact 
of certain crimes (notably extortion and association for criminal 
purposes) that may be assumed as proxies for the presence of organised 
crime have a significant and negative effect on FDI inflows towards 
Italian provinces.  
In our approach, the presence of organised crime is a structural 
constraint which limits the possibility of creating certain basic conditions 
which determine an area’s degree of attractiveness for outside investors. 
For example, by creating disincentives for business location, de facto 
organised crime reduces the possibility of creating positive conditions 
(economies of agglomeration) which trigger virtuous cumulative 
processes. In other words, the presence of organised crime is a 
disincentive of the local socio-economic context: a basic «competitive 
disadvantage».    
 Importantly, the presence of organised crime reflects negatively 
on the overall image of the Mezzogiorno and hence on the perceptions of 
potential investors. The overall impact could thus be greater than that 
resulting from empirical analyses based the variables observed.  
In many areas of the Mezzogiorno (and not only there), illegality 
originating in mafia organisations is a manifestation — undoubtedly the 
most glaring and tragic— of a social environment characterised by other 
forms of illegality. There is illegality arising from forms of corruption 
and misgovernment and what is often termed “weak legality” which 
arises from violation of laws which, though non-penal are nonetheless 
important for the good functioning of the economy (La Spina, 2008). 
These forms of illegality lead to an economic and institutional context 
that creates disincentives for business activity.  
The relationship between crime and FDI is therefore complex. 
Do foreign firms not invest in the south because they are afraid of being 
directly hit by crime — for example by extortion or other types of 
conditioning — or is organised crime perceived as a signal of a poor 
socio-institutional context and of an unfavourable business climate for 
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investment? Although our analysis does not provide an answer to such 
questions, it is nonetheless an important point which leaves space for 
further research. 
A clear policy implication can be drawn from our analysis. An 
improvement in security conditions (and, if possible, in the socio-
institutional system in the Mezzogiorno) is a prerequisite for improving the 
degree of attractiveness of weaker areas in Italy.  
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Appendix 
Figure 1. Provincial concentration of crimes: Lorenz curves  
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